Steinar Bøyum

Intransitive Learning

2012-01-25T17:33:00.001+01:00

"Intransitive Learning - A Piece of Grammar"

paper

Most definitions of the concept of learning seem to assume that when we learn, there is something we learn, something we acquire. Yet these assumptions are put in doubt by certain uses of the word “learn,” as this paper tries to demonstrate. These uses typically occur in the context of what is sometimes called learning from life. After major experiences we are sometimes inclined to say that we have learned a lot, but when asked what we have learned, we cannot say, or we can only repeat something we already knew – yet still we will say that we learned. Taking a cue from Ludwig Wittgenstein, I shall call these applications of the concept of learning for intransitive learning. The current paper attempts to outline the logical grammar of this small but remarkable area of the conceptual landscape of learning. This area is easily overlooked, especially when we operate with a certain picture of what learning is or must be. One conclusion of the paper is that in contexts of intransitive learning “to learn” functions as a psychological verb, in Wittgenstein’s sense, so that reports of intransitive learning are, at least in some respects, like avowals or expressions.

Physical Education

2012-01-25T17:32:00.002+01:00

"Mind and Body - A Problem in the Philosophy of Physical Education"

paper

Amy Gutmann

2012-01-01T18:01:00.000+01:00

"Amy Gutmann - Deliberasjon som danningideal", i Danningens Filosofihistorie (red. Straume).

forthcoming

John Rawls

2012-01-01T18:00:00.000+01:00

"John Rawls - Danning til Rettferd", i Danningens Filosofihistorie (red. Straume).

forthcoming

Evidensbasert undervising

2011-09-09T14:07:00.000+02:00

"Ideen om evidensbasert undervising - eit filosofisk forsvar"

submitted
In the debate about evidence-based teaching one often encounters philosophical arguments. Such arguments are characterized by being principled and general, in the sense of not resting on whether meta-analyses or randomized controlled experiments are well or poorly executed. In this article I look at several such philosophical arguments against evidence-based teaching and the relevance of RCT’s for education: instrumentalism, normativity, judgment, contextuality, complexity, and identification. I conclude that none of these arguments are valid. This does not mean that evidence-based education is unproblematic, but it does mean that the best arguments are practical rather than philosophical.

Key words: Evidence-based teaching, RCT, instrumentalism, contextuality, philosophy of science

The Political Conception as Educator

2011-01-01T20:34:00.000+01:00

"Rawls' idea of the Political Conception as Educator"

European Journal of Political Theory, forthcoming
This paper explores John Rawls’ strangely neglected notion, the political conception as educator, which captures how the public political culture can educate citizens. The aim is to elucidate both the idea itself and above all its function in Rawls’ Political Liberalism. After first surveying its main content and some historical parallels, the main body of the paper explores why Rawls places so much trust in the educative effect of institutions and, apparently, so little in schools. Along the way we shall discuss the relation between political liberalism and republicanism, the border disagreement between political conception and comprehensive doctrine, Mackie’s distinction between wide and narrow morality, and the importance of trust in Rawls’ view of society.

Rawls som praktisk filosof

2010-08-11T20:30:00.003+02:00

"Rawls som praktisk filosof"

(Rawls as practical philosopher)

Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 03/2010

John Rawls is often seen as the archetypal abstract Theoretician within political philosophy. Some will also find his theory utopian and rationalist, in the negative sense. In this paper, though, the aim is to demonstrate that Rawls’ political philosophy is deeply practical. This is done by an interpretation of three different elements in his thought: Philosophical method, the original position, and publicity. The interpretations of Richard Rorty and Burton Dreben are criticized, whereas the thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Pierre Hadot, and Stanley Cavell are used to clarify Rawls’ project.

Keywords: John Rawls, political philosophy, practical philosophy, original position, publicity, Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Forskning og håndverk

2009-11-09T15:21:00.002+01:00

"Forskning og håndverk"

("Research and craft")

Uniped, nr. 2, 2010
Forskerutdanningen blir stadig mer strukturert. Studentene får tettere oppfølging og deltar i forskerskoler, forskergrupper og forskningsprosjekt. En side ved denne utviklingen er at flere og flere synes å forstå forskning som et håndverk man må lære seg. En av disse var Steinar Kvale, som hevdet at forskning er et håndverk og blir eller bør bli lært gjennom en type mesterlære. Den foreliggende artikkelen består av en kritisk diskusjon av denne sammenligningen eller sammenblandingen av forskning og håndverk, forskerutdanning og håndverkslære (Kvale 1997). Jeg hevder at Kvale sin teori er uklar på sentrale punkter, og at hvis man forsøker å presisere teoriens sentrale tese, så forfaller den til enten trivialitet eller falskhet. Konklusjonen er at forskning er en aktivitet som både har kunstneriske og håndverksmessige aspekter. Forskerutdanning kan derfor fruktbart sammenlignes med både kunstutdanning og håndverkslære, så lenge vi ikke blander sammen sammenligning og overensstemmelse.

Kunnskap og Vurdering

2009-11-09T14:33:00.000+01:00

"Kunnskap og Vurdering"

("Knowledge and Assessment")

i Kunnskap i Skolen, Sylvi Stenersen Hovdenak & Ola Erstad (red.). Trondheim: Tapir Akademisk Forlag, 2010.

Artikkelen tek for seg vurdering av læring i skulen. Dette er eit konfliktfylt tema. Prøvar, karakterar, eksamen, rangering og måling er kontroversielle tema som lett set sinn i kok. Til dels er det slik fordi feltet er politisk lada. Men det fins også filosofiske oppfatningar som ligg under slike debattar og spelar med. Dette kjem for eksempel til uttrykk i formuleringar om at læring ”ikkje kan målast” eller at danning ”ikkje kan bli vurdert”. Ein filosof som har prøvd å systematisere slike oppfatningar er Andrew Davis. Artikkelen diskuterer Davis sin filosofiske kritikk av det han kallar vurderingsregimet i skulen. Konklusjonen er at Davis ikkje har levert tungtvegande filosofiske argument mot summativ vurdering, og at ein eventuell kritikk av vurderingsregimet må basere seg på praktiske og empiriske argument. Indirekte søkjer artikkelen også å seie noko om høvet mellom filosofi og pedagogikk, teori og praksis.

Philosophical Education

2008-11-29T19:11:00.010+01:00

"The Concept of Philosophical Education"
Educational Theory, 60 (5), pp. 543-559, 2010 .

Strangely, the concept of philosophical education is not much in use, at least not as a philosophical concept. In the present essay, I attempt to outline such a philosophical concept of philosophical education. I will use Plato’s allegory of the cave, Descartes’ life of doubt, and Kant’s criticism of metaphysics as paradigms or defining examples of the concept. My aim is not exegetical. Rather, I hope to describe these examples in a way that will let their character as conceptions of philosophical education show forth. The underlying aim will be to show which forms such conception may take and also why philosophical education is or should be an important topic for both philosophy and education.

Keywords: philosophy; education; Plato; Descartes; Kant.

Å vite hva man tror

2008-11-29T19:10:00.009+01:00

"Å vite hva man tror - Selverkjennelse og førstepersonautoritet hos Davidson, Hacker og Wittgenstein"

("Knowing your beliefs - Self-knowledge and first-person authority in Davidson, Hacker and Wittgenstein")
Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift (Norwegian Journal of Philosophy), Vol. 44, Nr. 1, s. 66-77, 2009.

First person authority has become a main philosophical topic the last decades. The current paper examines Peter Hacker’s criticism of two classic articles by Donald Davidson on first person authority. It also discusses Hacker’s use of some remarks from Wittgenstein in the course of this criticism. It is argued, first, that both Hacker and Davidson disregard how questions of self-knowledge are both central to and pervasive in human life. Second, Hacker’s position leads to a fairly typical philosophical quandary: we run into a position where we are forced to choose between the false and the weird (moreover, it just this hovering between falsity and weirdness that creates the illusion of substantial truth in Hacker’s view). Third, Hacker and Davidson have more in common than Hacker acknowledges, but the features that unite them separate them from Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy.

Key words: first person authority, self-knowledge, Hacker, Davidson, Wittgenstein

Ei Offentleg Stemme

2008-11-29T18:46:00.004+01:00

"Ei offentleg stemme - Estetikk og Politikk hjå Rawls og Cavell"

("In a Public Voice - Aesthetics and Politics in Rawls and Cavell")
Agora, 1-2/2008, s. 84-102

I shall propose the following: The aesthetic judgement, as laid out by Kant, provides a regulative idea of public reason in a liberal democracy. Thus using Kantian aesthetics in political philosophy is a move usually associated with Hannah Arendt. Yet I shall now argue that the later thought of John Rawls brings us into the same region, even though his conception of public reason will be modified in order to allow for such a development (whether that will amount to a modification beyond recognition is a question I will have to avoid). This modification (or transformation) is at each step influenced by Stanley Cavell, but it is not intended as a representation of his thought. It is, rather, an articulation of my response to Rawls, though conditioned by some of Cavell’s typical themes, starting with his interpretation of Kant’s aesthetic judgement.

Philosophical Experience

2008-11-29T18:45:00.001+01:00

“The Concept of Philosophical Experience”
Metaphilosophy, 2008 ;Volum 39.(3) p. 265-281

We often speak about religious experience, and sometimes we speak about metaphysical experience. Yet we seldom hear about philosophical experience. Is philosophy purely a matter of theories and theses, or does it have an experiential aspect? In this paper, I shall argue for the following three claims. First, there is something we might call philosophical experience, and there is nothing mystical about it. Second, philosophical experiences are expressed in something quite similar to what Kant called aesthetic judgements. Third, philosophical experiences are expressed by using words in what Wittgenstein called secondary sense. Finally, I try to show the educational significance of pursing philosophical experiences. Through articulating them one might find one’s ground, and through articulating them in a less private and more universal form one might raise oneself to universality. Thus, in expressing philosophical experiences one aspires to speak in a universal voice.

Keywords: aesthetic judgement, Kant, philosophical experience, secondary sense, universality, Wittgenstein

Barndom i Berlin

2008-05-29T18:44:00.003+02:00

"Barndom i Berlin - Lesing, erfaring, danning", April 2008

("Berlin Childhood - Reading, Experience, and Education")
Replikk, april 2008

Words from Nowhere - Limits of Criticism

2008-05-29T18:43:00.000+02:00

“Words from Nowhere - Limits of Criticism”
Philosophical Investigations (Vol. 31, Issue 2, Page 161-181, Apr 2008)

In the present essay, I aim to accentuate an analogy between the patterns of thought articulated by Berkeley’s Hylas and those of Nagel in his philosophy of bats and aliens. The comparison has a critical purpose, with Philonous playing a role similar to that of Wittgenstein. I argue that Nagel’s central claim comes down to statements that are marked by a peculiar form of emptiness. Towards the end, though, I will concede that this kind of Wittgensteinian criticism runs up against certain limits. The fantasies produced by Hylas or Nagel have as counterparts genuine philosophical expressions of experience, which are not vulnerable to the charges levelled at their theoretical parallels.

Political Theory of Education

2008-05-29T18:42:00.001+02:00

“What is a Political Theory of Education”
Nordic Journal of Education 2008 ;Volum 2008.(1) p. 30-37

In the present essay, I attempt to develop a distinction between moral and political theories of education, inspired by the work of Amy Gutmann. The main idea is that whereas a moral theory of education gives an account of an ideal (or at least good) education, a political theory gives an account of how to structure education in a democracy where there is deep disagreement on what constitutes an ideal (or good) education. Unfortunately, we sometimes speak as though our moral theories can be unproblematically translated into the political realm, but in doing so, we are either being outright undemocratic or we underestimate the significance of the world-view pluralism in modern, liberal democracies. In order for a political theory of education to be democratically acceptable, it must fulfill the criterion of being capable of democratic translation into a society characterized by deep pluralism.

Key Words: education; democracy; politics; pluralism; Amy Gutmann.

Philosophy and Language Learning

2007-11-29T18:38:00.003+01:00

“Philosophy and Language Learning”
Studies in Philosophy and Education 2007 ;Volum 26.(1) p. 43-56

In this paper, I explore different ways of picturing language learning in philosophy, all of them inspired by Wittgenstein and all of them concerned about scepticism of meaning. I start by outlining the two pictures of children and language learning that emerges from Kripke’s famous reading of Wittgenstein. Next, I explore how social-pragmatic readings, represented by Meredith Williams, attempt to answer the sceptical anxieties. Finally, drawing somewhat on Stanley Cavell, I try to resolve these issues by investigating what characteristically happens to our view of language learning when we do philosophy. The focus throughout is on the relation between the individual (the learning child) and the community (usually represented by the parents), and how that relation is deformed when we operate with a certain philosophical notion of ground.

Key words: Language; learning; children; Kripke; Cavell; Wittgenstein

Philosophical Allegories in Rousseau

2007-11-29T18:38:00.002+01:00

“Philosophical Allegories in Rousseau”
Philosophy and Literature, Vol. 31, Number 1, April 2007, p. 67-78.

In this essay, I point to an aspect of doing philosophy that is both often overlooked and educationally important. This is the activity of constructing philosophical allegories, of describing or recounting parts of one’s life in more or less explicit philosophical terms. I exemplify this idea of philosophical allegory through readings of three tales in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s autobiographical works. Finally, I point to how the exercise of this capacity for constructing philosophical allegories acts as a counter-force to the kind of melancholia that is now becoming a permanent cultural condition. Learning to see oneself as a philosophical image at least provides a semblance of deeper meaning to what otherwise seems meaningless.

The Legitimacy of Critical Thinking

2005-11-29T18:36:00.000+01:00

”The Legitimacy of Critical Thinking: Political Liberalism and Compulsory Education”
Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children, vol.18, #1.

This essay examines the political-philosophical legitimacy of critical thinking as an aim of compulsory education. Although critical thinking is given an important role in Norwegian educational policy, the right to demand a critical attitude from all citizens has been extensively debated in political and pedagogical philosophy the last two decades. This debate stems in large part from the late work of John Rawls. In this essay, I start by stating the case for critical thinking as an educational aim, focusing on democratic education. Next, I give an account of the challenge that Rawls’ later philosophy puts to education for critical thinking. Finally, I discuss some possible ways of responding to the Rawls. The upshot will be that some aspects of critical thinking can and must be defended as politically legitimate. However, any such defence must include a reply to the Rawlsian argument – if not, it will simply be naïve. In that sense, much Norwegian educational policy has been naïve.

Key words: Critical thinking; democratic education; autonomy; political liberalism

Sekundære Uttrykk

2005-11-29T18:34:00.001+01:00

”Sekundære uttrykk – Ordenes ansikt og estetisk ekspressivitet”

("Secondary expressions - The face of words and aesthetic expression")
Nordic Journal of Aesthetics / Nordisk Estetisk Tidskrift, 30/2005

Philosophical Experience in Childhood

2004-12-31T18:31:00.001+01:00

“Philosophical experience in childhood”
Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children, 3/2004.

Aspekter og paradigmer

2002-12-31T18:20:00.002+01:00

"Aspekter og paradigmer. Vårt perseptuelle forhold til estetisk ekspressivitet"

("Aspects and paradigms - our perceptual relation to aesthetic expressivity") Nordic Journal of Aesthetics / Nordisk Estetisk Tidskrift, 25-26/2002.

Aspekter og ansikter

2002-12-31T18:15:00.004+01:00

"Aspekter og ansikter – Fysiognomisk persepsjon av andre mennesker”

("Faces and aspects - Physiognomic perception of other human beings") Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift (Norwegian Journal of Philosophy), 4/2002.

Kunstverkets metode

2002-12-31T17:56:00.006+01:00

”Kunstverkets metode – Gadamers begrep om kunstverkets Selbstdarstellung”

("The method of art - Gadamer's concept of the Selbstdarstellung of the work of art") Kunst og Kultur, 3/2002.

Variasjoner over ukjent tema

2002-12-31T17:56:00.005+01:00

”Variasjoner over ukjent tema – Bokanmeldelse av Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel”

("Variations on an unknown theme - Review of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel") Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift (Norwegian Journal of Philosophy), 4/2002

Filosofi og naivitet

2002-12-31T17:28:00.002+01:00

”Filosofi og naivitet – Idealtypiske syn på filosofiens forhold til det barnlige”

("Philosophy and naiveté - Ideal-typical views on philosophy's attitude to the childlike")

Barn, 2/2002.